Abstract-Out-of-step detection methods for generators depend on impedance measurements that are mapped from the angular difference between the generator source and the Thévenin equivalent of the interconnected system. Though implemented successfully with decades of operating experience, the mapping is not the most accurate due to a simplified model. This paper proposes an improved out-of-step detection method for generators by means of the most direct indicator-angular difference. The generator's rotor angle is estimated with a particle filter-based dynamic state estimator and the angular separation is then calculated by combining the raw local phasor measurements with this estimate. The method is also enhanced with the real-time stability analysis that is able to predict marginally unstable swings. The approach is illustrated via dynamic simulations on the New England 10-generator, 39-bus system. While consistent with the traditional schemes for out-of-step detection, the proposed method is advantageous in that it does not make any simplifying assumptions in its formulation, and provides early detection for unstable swings resulting in reduced stresses on the breaker and generator. The proposed approach shows great potential to supervise the conventional relay with availability of synchrophasor measurements and computational power.
optimal relay parameters [1] . The most secure scheme for determining OOS condition is Trip-On-Way-Out in single and double blinder schemes [1] . However, the security comes at the cost of extended time for pole slipping, subjecting the generator to pulsating torque, high rotor iron currents, and stator currents potentially higher than short-circuit rating [2] , [3] . This is considered as one of the gaps in secure detection of OOS conditions [4] .
The other drawback of currently used OOS schemes is that the angular separation between breaker contacts is high when it is opened after detection of OOS condition, bringing extensive stress to the breaker. Unless the breaker is dedicated for an OOS duty, the tripping will be intentionally postponed until the angle separation goes beyond a certain value (e.g. 270
• ). This is tentatively achieved by the Trip-On-Way-Out in single and double blinder schemes [1] , but at the cost of extended period of pole-slipping, and associated stresses on generator.
It would therefore be useful if the detection of unstable swings can be made earlier without losing security. Considerable research work has been done to predict the swing stability beforehand such that trip could be initiated at a small angular value, so operation of both breaker and generator can be made safer. The equal-area criterion in time domain using only local power output information is studied in [5] . A state-plane method is applied to detect loss of synchronism in [6] . OOS protection for distributed generation unit using equal-area criterion is examined in [7] . While the equal-area criterion is a widely used basis to devise settings for the OOS relay, some of the underlying assumptions behind it include: (a) the single-machine-infinite bus (SMIB) treatment for the generator under consideration with the rest of the system abstracted as an infinite bus, (b) neglecting flux decay, effects of high-gain automatic voltage regulators (AVR), supplementary controllers such as power system stabilizers, and frequency control loops. When such effects are modeled in a general multi-machine scenario, unstable swings could occur beyond the first swing (time frame of interest can extend to 10 seconds and above) [8] and include multiple dynamic modes. Since these traditional assumptions are restrictive, alternate methods have been proposed to improve OOS schemes. Neural network and fuzzy logic based methods are reported in [9] and [10] respectively to predict the stability of the swings in real-time using synchrophasor information to enhance OOS detection. A standing limitation of such soft-computing based methods is the requirement for large training sets which involves extensive case studies. A Lyapunov-based direct method is applied to on-line monitoring of rotor angle stability [11] using the maximum Lyapunov exponent to predict an OOS condition. A real-time loss-of-synchronism detection algorithm using energy function analysis is proposed in [12] . While these methods show satisfactory performance, they do require wide-area information to make centralized decisions which elevates the complexity for local OOS protection.
Dynamic state estimation (DSE) is an emerging paradigm exploiting the computation power and availability of synchrophasor measurements to estimate the internal variables of generators. The dynamic nature and off-nominal-frequency behaviors of the power systems necessitates the need for DSE in both normal and emergency situations [13] . Initial work for wide-area and decentralized system control applications based on DSE has been reported in [14] and [15] . Since DSE provides firsthand information of the internal states (e.g rotor angles and flux-linkages) of the generators, it is intuitive to investigate the possibility of DSE-assisted protection applications for generators.
In this paper, we use DSE to propose an approach that calls for the most direct form of stability assessment: by monitoring the angular difference between machine's rotor angle and the phase angle of the voltage at the high-voltage (HV) side of the stepup transformer. This provides a direct indication of the OOS conditions without making any simplifying assumptions, and using local measurements. The other advantage of the proposed scheme is early prediction of marginally unstable swings by performing stability analysis on the angular difference if the generator survives the first swing. We show that both DSE and instability prediction are possible in real time using available computing resources. We compare the proposed scheme with the Trip-On-Way-Out single-blinder approach and show that the scheme matches the security of this approach, while allowing early detection for OOS phenomena.
II. RATIONALE AND ASSUMPTIONS BEHIND THE CONVENTIONAL OOS PROTECTION RELAY
The OOS relay for a generator (device 78) is usually located at the terminal of the generator [3] as shown in Fig. 1 , where V s ∠φ and Z system represent the system Thévenin equivalent (the other symbols are defined in the following section). The most widelyused OOS protection scheme attached to large generators [16] uses blinders (single or double) with a mho element, with sample characteristics as shown in Fig. 2 . For the single-blinder scheme (left one in Fig. 2) , the impedance has to enter the mho element from outside and then traverse both blinders (B1 and B2) to trigger a trip signal. The trip can be delayed until the impedance leaves the mho element [3] . For the double-blinder scheme, the OOS condition is detected when the impedance stays between the outer and inner blinders longer than a preset threshold. Determining the settings for these relays is based on careful stability studies to prevent operation during stable swings while tripping at an opportune moment when an unstable swing is interpreted. Single blinder scheme is easier to set and very secure in detecting OOS; however, it takes more time in detection. The double-blinder scheme allows prompt operation, but determining the inner blinder (B2 in Fig. 2 ) settings requires very careful analysis; with poor choices leading to misoperation during stable swings. Since (falsely) tripping large generator units under stable swings can severely undermine system stability, the single-blinder scheme is generally preferred over the double-blinder scheme for OOS protection. The trip logic usually requires the impedance loci to traverse both blinders and then trip on either exiting the second blinder or the mho element.
The impedance seen by the distance relays during power swings has been well studied in [17] . Although the actual impedance loci can be more complex if AVR and governor effects are included, the theory approximately describes the behaviors during power swings and sets the foundation of convention OOS relay. It has been proved in [18] that decreasing apparent impedance magnitude implies increasing angular difference at the electrical center of a two-source model with equal voltage magnitude, [18] :
where Z m is the apparent impedance seen by the OOS relay, X, the total reactance between the two sources andδ, the angular difference between the two sources. Equation (1) indicates that diminishing values of the apparent impedance magnitude seen by the OOS relay is equivalent to an advancing angular differenceδ before the electrical center is crossed. Since the angular difference is not available, relay 78 depends on the impedance mapping. However, since such mapping is made with simplifying assumption, extensive simulations of actual system-conditions are required for setting the relay. Therefore, accurate estimation ofδ can provide a more generalized and dependable OOS protection. Such a scheme is described in the next section. 
III. DSE-ASSISTED OOS DETECTION BASED ON ANGULAR DIFFERENCE MONITORING
Due to the lack of phase angle information in the past, angle separations between the power system and generator was indirectly assessed using impedance measurements, as described in Section II. Conventional OOS relays utilize the measured apparent impedance and pre-determined settings to detect a power swing, and initiate tripping when it is unstable. The availability of PMU measurements partially simplifies this task because the phase angle of the voltage phasor can be measured directly. Additionally, internal rotor angle (or power angle) of the machine could be derived or calibrated [19] based on the measurements, which has been adopted for generator modeling in voltage stability analysis [20] . However, the rotor angle of the generator is still not generally amenable to direct measurement and hence needs to be estimated. This is one of the key steps in the proposed approach outlined in this section. The overall scheme of the proposed approach is illustrated in Fig. 3 . Components of the figure are explained now. 1) Utilizing PMU measurements assumed available at the substation, we construct a particle filter (PF)-based dynamic state estimator (block DSE in Fig. 3 ). Based on the generator model and phasor information from the PMU, the filter generates estimates of the generator's internal dynamic states. For OOS protection, since we are interested in the swing dynamics, we focus on estimates of rotor angle δ. Formulation of PF-based estimator and reasons for its choice are described in Section III-A. 2) Swing analysis is performed based on the angular differenceδ between rotor angle (δ) and voltage angle of HV-side of the transformer (θ) (block Swing Analysis in Fig. 3 ). This block is further explained in Fig. 4 .δ act (chosen to be 60 • ) serves as a threshold to flag the presence of a swing, and activate the OOS module. The purpose of this module is to trace the trajectory of a monotonically unstable swing. Once the swing is flagged, the observedδ is compared against a threshold to declare OOS. The threshold is set toδ th = 120
• -which is consistent with conventional relay settings [1] , [2] . Thus, in case of a monotonically unstable swing, this module will detect OOS usingδ, without needing to use the imperfectly converted impedance plane. 3) If the swing is marginally unstable, the generator may survive the first swing andδ may not crossδ act , and the OOS module may not be triggered. At this point, it would be useful to be able to determine quickly if this swing is stable or not. This is accomplished by the Modal Analysis block which provides the damping ratios associated with the swing mode. The angular differenceδ is fed to the modal analysis tool (Matrix Pencils, in our case) to determine the damping factors of the swing dynamics. This helps early determination if the swing will be unstable or not. Matrix Pencils is briefly described in Section III-B. Results generated by either block are converted to trip/restrain decision and the breaker is commanded accordingly. It is to be noted that the breaker can also be actuated by the conventional OOS relay (78) as shown in Fig. 3 , instead of recommending its replacement, we are proposing and evaluating an alternate method.
A. Estimation with Particle Filter
The use of a particle filter for DSE in the context of multimachine systems is described in detail in [21] . A brief overview is presented here. The filter considers a discrete time representation of a nonlinear system given by:
where the system state x k at step k is a function of the previous state x k −1 , system input u k −1 and system process noise n k −1 . The filter is designed such that the state x k can be estimated recursively based on the system model as well as the measurement model:
where measurement z k is a function of the state x k and measurement model process noise m k .
To solve the dynamic state estimation problem using a particle filter (PF), the posterior density at step k is approximated by:
where z 1:k is a set of measurements available up to step k, Δ the delta function, x j k (j = 1, . . . , N) a set of particles, N the number of particles, w j k a set of weights. If we draw the particles x j k from a density q(x k |z 1:k ) (or importance density), which is easier to accomplish than drawing it from p(x k |z 1:k ), the importance sampling weight is given by:
This representation is further simplified as [22] :
where z * k is the obtained measurement at step k. The steps of implementing PF for state estimation is summarized as follows:
1) Initialize the particles {x Compared with other widely used DSE algorithms (extended Kalman filter (EKF) and unscented Kalman filter (UKF)), the PF is not restricted by model assumption (e.g probability distribution of measurement noise is Gaussian) and yields superior results on nonlinear/non-Gaussian systems at the expense of increased computational effort [22] .
We use the 6th-order model [23] (or model 2.2) to represent the generator dynamics, the mathematical model in per unit is given by:δ i = 2πf 0 Δω i ,
,
where i is the generator index in a multi-machine system, f 0 = (7) can be found in [23] . In Fig. 3 , a PMU is assumed available at the HV side of the step-up transformer providing us phasor measurements of voltage |V h |∠θ and current |I h |∠ϕ. Rotor angle δ is defined as the phase angle of the internal voltage (E q = V h + j(X q + X T ) I h ) behind synchronous reactance X q and step-up transformer reactance X T . In addition, the measurements of the generator's field voltage (E f d ), mechanical power input (P m ) and power outputs (P e and Q e ) are used. The state vector x, input vector u and output vector z in this paper are defined as:
B. Modal Analysis of Angular Difference
Since the oscillatory response involving inertial dynamics of generators includes several low frequency characteristic modes, typically in the range: (0.2∼0.7 Hz) -corresponding to interarea modes, or the local rotor modes in the range of 0.7∼2 Hz [24] , the simplistic equal-area criterion may be inadequate, since stability could be lost even if the system survives the first swing after the disturbance. Modal analysis is a standard technique to identify the characteristic modes and their dampings from the dynamic response, thus serving as a tool to monitor stability. The basic principle is to represent an evenly sampled data set in terms of a weighted sum of exponentials from which the damping ratio can be extracted. While Prony analysis [25] has been customarily used in the past for online modal content analysis, we use Matrix Pencils [26] as an alternative, noting its robustness to noise. Some of the extracted modes with low or negative damping factor may result in false decisions of the stability. The procedure for modal analysis upon the angular difference in our study is as follows: 1) We perform a modal analysis of the angular difference (estimated via Particle Filtering) using Matrix Pencils. 2) From the modal analysis results, we determine the stability of rotor oscillations based on the damping factors of the local mode (0.7∼2 Hz). Simulation results are presented next to illustrate the proposed method and track its performance alongside the single blinder method.
IV. SIMULATION RESULTS
The proposed scheme is tested on the New England 10-generator system [27] , which is shown in Fig. 5 . For all test cases the measurement reporting rate of the PMU is set at a conservative value of 30 frames per second [19] . This was found suitable to complete all calculations required between two consecutive samples, based on the execution time of our code. All the phasor information (in complex form) is measured at the HV-side of the transformer and assumed to have 3% additive Gaussian white noise as measurement error. The phasor information is plugged into the PF-based estimator and all equations modeling the synchronous generator are assumed to have 1% additive Gaussian white noise as process error. We also assume that the system outputs stay unchanged for each PF estimation step between two consecutive PMUs' measurement sampling instants. Note that PF operates with 80 (N ) particles. Generally, the lager the number of particles, the higher the accuracy. The accuracy versus number of particles trade-off is discussed in detail in [21] . The generators are modeled accounting for subtransient dynamics [24] . The prime mover dynamics (steam-turbine governor) and the excitation system (IEEE DC1A) models are considered for each generator except for generator #10, which has constant excitation input. The impedance seen by the relays shown for all the cases are noise-free results. In the relay settings, the blinder distance for both sides are equal and based on a conservative value 120
• , and the OOS relays are not responsible for cases where electrical centers reside on the system side. The size of the mho element is based on the recommendations from [16] and the settings are noted in Appendix. The results are shown for monotonically unstable and marginally unstable oscillatory swings. For numerous well defined stable swings, the proposed method is consistent with classical OOS operation with similar results. The simulation results show the estimated angular differences using PF/PMU and the impedance loci used by relay 78. It is to be noted that the breaker opening times considered in the simulation cases are unusually large and are chosen in order to generate the desired swing characteristics.
A. Verifying the Security of the Proposed Method 1) Worst Stable Swing:
A three-phase to ground fault occurs on line 25-26 at t = 6 s. The faulted line is tripped and permanently removed by opening the circuit breaker at both ends of Fig. 6 . The worst stable swing is created by clearing the fault 1 cycle earlier than the unstable case, i.e., after 13 cycles.
The fault is cleared at t = 6.217 s (13 cycles after the fault), the stability is maintained after the first swing. Impedance seen by the OOS relay at the terminal of G 8 , and the angular difference are illustrated in Fig. 7 . The post fault impedance locus exits the mho element from the same quadrant it enters; the stable swing does not trigger any false trip. Whenδ crosses 60
• , the OOS module is triggered, but since the value does not cross the 120
• threshold, the module does not declare an OOS condition, consistent with the relay decision. Since the method is shown to work well for the worst stable swing, it also covers milder (stable) swings (which are not reported here) .
2) Coordination With OOS Relay on the Transmission Line:
A temporary three-phase to ground fault happens on line 22-23 close to bus #23 at t = 6 s. The fault is self-cleared at t = 6.25 s (15 cycles later) without tripping the line. Generator #6 (denoted by G 6 ) and generator #7 (denoted by G 7 ) lose the synchronism with rest of the system and together form a coherent group. Rotor angle estimations for generator 1 through 9 and angular differences for G 6 and G 7 are displayed in Fig. 8 . In this case, the swing centers reside on the transmission lines, the proposed method is not supposed to respond to the disturbance. It was observed that though the OOS module was triggered for G-6, the proposed method did not generate a trip decision asδ did not cross the threshold. Thus, the decision made by the proposed method complies with the conventional relay as it does not interfere with the OOS protective relays on line 21-22 and line 23-24.
3) Performance During the Loss of Excitation Event:
The occurrence a loss of excitation (LOE) event will force the generator to drain massive reactive power from the system. The decay of the field current will weaken the coupling between the rotor and the stator and eventually lead to an OOS condition [3] . An acceptable LOE protective relay for synchronous generators is an offset mho distance relay in single phase [28] . Considering the impact from stable swings and voltage regulator performance, we implement a two-zone scheme as proposed in [29] . The partial and complete LOE incidents are created by setting the field voltage for Generator #4 (denoted by G 4 ) 1.1 p.u and 0 p.u respectively (pre-fault value is 2.25 p.u). Impedance seen by the LOE relay for G 4 and the estimated angular difference for both cases are shown in Figs. 9 and 10 . The results indicate the proposed approach correctly identifies the OOS condition for both partial and complete LOE cases and the operation is also consistent with the LOE relay which operates according to its corresponding zone time delay settings.
B. Verification of Dependability of the Proposed Scheme and Advantages of the Predictive Feature 1) Detection of Monotonically Unstable Power Swings:
Considering the same fault condition described in the "worst stable swing" case in Sec. IV-A1, the fault is cleared t = 6.233 s instead (14 cycles after the fault) and stability is lost during the first swing as seen in Fig. 6 . Generator #9 (denoted by G 9 ) and G 8 lose the synchronism with rest of the system and form two coherent groups individually. Angular difference between rotor angle of G 8 and voltage angle of bus #25 and impedance seen by the OOS relay at the terminal of G 8 are illustrated in Fig. 11 . Considering the threshold of 120
• , the suggestive tripping decision (at 6.467 s) by the proposed method abides by the actual relay decision (at 6.8 s). However, the breaker can be tripped at an early instant and also at a safe interruption angle (approximately 132
• assuming 2-cycle breaker opening time). Clearly, for slower (unstable) swings, the proposed method will issue earlier alerts for potential threats compared to the conventional relay.
2) Detection of Marginally Unstable Power Swings: A temporary three-phase to ground fault is created on line 2-11 close to bus #2 at t = 6s. The fault is self-cleared at t = 6.25 s (15 cycles later) without tripping the line. Generator #2 (denoted by G 2 ) loses its synchronism due to the disturbance. The impedance seen by the OOS relay at G 2 are shown in Fig. 12 . The swing trajectory exits the mho characteristics in the vicinity of its intersection with the left-side blinder. The interruption angle at t = 10.31 s for the beakers is around 282
• (assuming 2-cycle Fig. 11 . Impedance locus for the unstable swing and estimated angular difference for G 8 . Fig. 12 . Impedance locus and relay characteristics at G 2 for the OOS condition. Fig. 13 . Angular difference between G 2 and voltage angle of bus #6 along with the reproduced curve.
breaker opening time). Fig. 13 illustrates the angular difference between G 2 and voltage angle of bus #6 before loss-ofsynchronism. We can notice that the peak values are below the pre-determined threshold π/3 (elec.rad), hence the OOS module is not enabled. The modal analysis tool which is active during the swing reports the damping ratios as shown in Table. I. The tool continuously acquires the angular difference estimates and computes the damping ratio. The local mode (associated with the generator rotor dynamics) within 1∼1.2 Hz has a negative damping ratio throughout the analysis. As the minimum damping factor of any mode must be non-negative [30] , the potential unstable swing can be identified as early as t = 7.463 s. The conventional relay will trip at 10.28 s. The proposed method is able to detect this unstable swing much earlier compared to conventional method.
C. Supervision of Relay Behavior
There is no reliable backup to OOS relay that will operate quickly if the swing locus goes through transformer or the generator impedance. Loss of field relay may pickup for OOS, but due to time delays it may not operate fast enough. As far as the distance backup relay on the generator is concerned it also may have a time delay and may not see the impedance going through the generator during OOS. Thus, the conventional OOS scheme can benefit from supervision.
We show that the proposed method is potentially useful in case the settings of a OOS relay are set incorrectly. For illustration, we assume there is a corrupted setting for the blinders, where they are placed with sub-optimal reach (indicated by dashed vertical lines) in Fig. 14. A three-phase to ground fault happens on line 6-11 at t = 6s. The faulted line is tripped and permanently removed at t = 6.25 s. G 2 loses its synchronism due to the disturbance. Fig. 14 illustrates angular difference between rotor angle of G 2 and voltage angle of bus #6 and impedance seen by the OOS relay. Different from the test case in Sec. IV-B1, we can see that conventional relay with corrupt settings detects the unstable swing after two pole slippings while the proposed approach is able to detect the unstable swing before the first pole slipping (around t = 6.57 s). Such supervision can be advantageous in cases when the settings or the relay are compromised.
V. DISCUSSION
The proposed method is tested on a multi-machine system and hence eliminates the need for establishing a two-source equivalent model (necessary for conventional relay setup), or simplifying assumptions of generator control. Hence the proposed method is completely independent of the system configuration, controls, or wide-area communications.
The proposed method brings more computational burden as the estimation of the rotor angle ought to be provided in real time. This means the whole procedure must be implemented between two consecutive PMU measurements. For 30 fps reporting rate, this time is 1/30 = 33 ms. The simulations demonstrated above are carried out on a desktop PC with core i7 3.4 GHz processor and 8G memory. We use a 6th-order model to describe the generator dynamics in PF. Time taken for different processes on this computer is: 7.1 ms for PF to generate an estimate, and 6 ms for MP to perform modal analysis. Since implementation on dedicated hardware will only make these processes faster, it is clear that the proposed method is compatible for real time implementation.
Note that the suggested detection timestamps are all postponed due to the inevitable time delays in sensing and processing time in PMU. Since the PMU is assumed to be at the generator bus, we assume the phasor measurements are directly fed to the DSE block, and not transmitted to and from a PDC, so the communication delays are ignored. According to IEEE C37.118.2-2011 [31] , "delay in measurement is largely dependent on the processing window and filtering, which vary with the data reporting rate and the PMU class of service. Processing delays for calculating the measurement are generally very small compared with other delays." We assume that the time-stamp is associated with the center of the window, which means the delay due to windowing would be half the size of the window. We assume a P-Type PMU that typically has a 2-cycle window, meaning a delay of about 17 ms for a 60 Hz system. Adding filtering, PMU processing and transducer delays based on the table C.2 in IEEE C37.118.2-2011, the total delay in creating a PMU measurement would be about 25 ms. We adjust our timestamps using a conservative value of 30 ms, plus the delays in PF (taken as 7.1 ms) and MP (6 ms), when applicable.
The measurement noise level for PMU is selected to be 3%, which is a more stringent assumption compared to the suggested 1% in [19] . Note that noise level does not adversely affect the tracking performance (i.e. accuracy) of the PF.
VI. CONCLUSION
We introduce an OOS detection method based on direct estimation of angular difference to serve as a supervisory unit of conventional impedance type relays. The concept rests on two modules: (1) the availability of PMU measurements at the gen- erator bus and (2) a PF-based dynamic state estimator. The first two modules provide an estimate of the angular separation between the generator's rotor angle (treated as a dynamic state) and the external system. The separation is analyzed using a modal analysis tool (matrix pencils in this case) to determine (in advance) the damping of the modal content(s) and hence, the likelihood of potentially unstable swings. Simulation results on the 10-generator, 39-bus system show that the proposed approach does not require any simplification of system topology. The proposed approach is compared against the most secure OOS scheme -single blinder scheme. It is shown that the approach matches the security of this scheme, while providing early detection of OOS for both monotonically unstable and marginally unstable swings, resulting in reduced stresses on generator and circuit breaker.
APPENDIX

A. OOS Relay Settings
The blinder distance settings are given by :
where X T is the transformer impedance and δ c is the critical value of the angular separation. In the paper we use the conservative 120
• for this separation. The circular mho unit is set to reach in the system direction at 1.5 times the transformer impedance, and in the generator direction the reach is chosen at twice generator's transient reactance [16] .
In Sec. IV, two generators: G 8 and G 2 are involved in the simulation results; the dedicated OOS relay settings using the single blinder scheme is summarized in Table II . The Mho characteristics and the blinder separation (d) are given in per unit.
